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Life expectancy in the United States from
1900 to the present (Figure 1) shows an overall
steady rise, reflecting improved health conditions
in general, the result of advances in medical
science, hygiene, personal care, health technolo-
gies, and public health administrations. The rise
decelerates asymptotically to a near plateau from
the 1950s to the 1970s, reflecting an epidemic of
coronary disease, which we do not yet fully
understand. Improvements in medical care,
attention to life style, or indiscriminate use of
aspirin may all be responsible for the subsequent
decrease in deaths from coronary disease. Up to
the 1940s, the rising curve is jagged, reflecting
sporadic infectious disease outbreaks, especially
the Spanish influenza outbreak of 1918. Whether
the life expectancy curve continues to rise
smoothly or whether it has some jagged declines
depends on what we do about transmission of
infectious disease, including foodborne disease.
When plotted another way (Figure 2), both the
absolute number of deaths from infectious
disease and the proportion of total deaths
attributable to infectious disease also show
steady amelioration from 1900 almost to the
present.
The 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic may
be a prototype for future emerging infections.
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The basic principles of genetics and evolution apply equally to human hosts and to
emerging infections, in which foodborne outbreaks play an important and growing role.
However, we are dealing with a very complicated coevolutionary process in which
infectious agent outcomes range from mutual annihilation to mutual integration and
resynthesis of a new species. In our race against microbial evolution, new molecular
biology tools will help us study the past; education and a global public health perspective
will help us deal better with the future.
Figure 1. Life expectancy in the United States, at birth,
20th century.
Figure 2. Trends in infectious diseases mortality,
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Although minimized as not much more than a bad
cold, influenza took a terrible toll in 1918,
especially on young people (Figure 3). Somewhat
older persons may have been protected by
immunity from prior exposure to related strains
of influenza. The disease, with rapid onset of
fulminating pneumonic symptoms, killed 20 to 25
million persons worldwide. The infectious agent
was not available for study at that time. However,
very recently the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology recovered with PCR technology
genetic fragments of the 1918 influenza virus (1).
Less than 10% of the entire genome has been
recovered to date, but recovery of complete
sequences is likely. Although the target genes
have not yet provided a clue as to why the 1918
influenza was so devastating, they demonstrate
the enormous potential of today’s molecular
biology tools.
These tools will enable us to better study
paleovirology and paleomicrobiology. We are
accustomed to stereotyping historical disease
outbreaks as if we really knew what they were,
but we really know very little detail about their
genetic features.  For example, we talk about the
great historic plagues as if they indeed were
Yersinia or cholera or malaria. We should look
forward to finding out about the 14th century
black death, if it was indeed Yersinia pestis.
Although clinically unmistakable, that is not to
say it was caused by the identical genotype of
present Yersinia strains.
We need to look ahead as well as back. In this
century, emerging and reemerging infections
have stimulated flurries of interest, but in
general we have been complacent about
infectious diseases ever since the introduction of
antibiotics. The effect of antibiotics on acute
infections and tuberculosis as well as the effect of
polio vaccination led to a national, almost
worldwide, redirection of attention to chronic and
constitutional diseases. However, the HIV
pandemic in the early 1980s caught us off guard,
reminding us that there are many more
infectious agents in the world. It is fortuitous that
retroviruses had already been studied from the
perspective of cancer etiology; otherwise, we
would have had no scientific platform whatsoever
for coping with HIV and AIDS.
The Committee on International Science
Engineering and Technology provided an inter-
agency review setting out a policy framework for
the United States’ global response to infectious
disease (Table 1). The policy provides a
worldwide mantle for surveillance and monitor-
ing, remedial measures, development of new
drugs, vaccines, and treatment modalities. The
global outlook is necessary, even if for purely
selfish reasons, because to infectious agents the
world is indivisible, with no national boundaries.
Our thinking has been impoverished in terms of
budget allocations for dealing with health on an
international basis.
We are engaged in a type of race, enmeshing
our ecologic circumstances with evolutionary
changes in our predatory competitors. To our
advantage, we have wonderful new technology;
we have rising life expectancy curves. To our
disadvantage, we have crowding; we have social,
political, economic, and hygienic stratification.
We have crowded together a hotbed of
opportunity for infectious agents to spread over a
significant part of the population. Affluent and
mobile people are ready, willing, and able to carry
afflictions all over the world within 24 hours’
notice. This condensation, stratification, and
mobility is unique, defining us as a very different
species from what we were 100 years ago. We are
enabled by a different set of technologies. But
despite many potential defenses—vaccines,
antibiotics, diagnostic tools—we are intrinsically
more vulnerable than before, at least in terms of
pandemic and communicable diseases.
We could imaginably adapt in a Darwinian
fashion, but the odds are stacked against us. We
cannot compete with microorganisms whose
populations are measured in exponents of 1012,
Figure 3. Pneumonia and influenza mortality, by age,
in certain epidemic years. (Reprinted with permission
of W. Paul Glezen and Epidemiologic Reviews. Emerg-
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1014, 1016 over periods of days. Darwinian natural
selection has led to the evolution of our species
but at a terrible cost. If we were to rely strictly on
biologic selection to respond to the selective
factors of infectious disease, the population
would fluctuate from billions down to perhaps
millions before slowly rising again. Therefore,
our evolutionary capability may be dismissed as
almost totally inconsequential. In the race
against microbial genes, our best weapon is our
wits, not natural selection on our genes.
New mechanisms of genetic plasticity of one
microbe species or another are uncovered almost
daily. Spontaneous mutation is just the begin-
ning. We are also dealing with very large
populations, living in a sea of mutagenic
influences (e.g., sunlight). Haploid microbes can
immediately express their genetic variations.
They have a wide range of repair mechanisms,
themselves subject to genetic control. Some
strains are highly mutable by not repairing their
DNA; others are relatively more stable. They are
extraordinarily flexible in responding to environ-
mental stresses (e.g., pathogens’ responses to
antibodies, saprophytes’ responses to new
environments). Mechanisms proliferate whereby
bacteria and viruses exchange genetic material
quite promiscuously. Plasmids now spread
throughout the microbial world (3). They can
cross the boundaries of yeast and bacteria.
Lateral transfer is very important in the
evolution of microorganisms. Their pathogenic-
ity, their toxicity, their antibiotic resistance do
not rely exclusively on evolution within a single
clonal proliferation.
We have a very powerful theoretical basis
whereby the application of selective pressure
(e.g., antibiotics in food animals) will result in
drug resistance carried by plasmids, or patho-
gens attacking humans. It is not easy to get direct
Table 1. Examples of pathogenic microbes and infectious diseases recognized since 1973 (2)
Year Microbe Type Disease
1973 Rotavirus Virus Major cause of infantile diarrhea worldwide
1975 Parvovirus B19 Virus Aplastic crisis in chronic hemolytic anemia
1976 Cryptosporidium Parasite Acute and chronic diarrhea parvum
1977 Ebola virus Virus Ebola hemorrhagic fever
1977 Legionella Bacteria Legionnaires’ disease pneumophila
1977 Hantaan virus Virus Hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HRFS)
1977 Campylobacter jejuni Bacteria Enteric pathogens distributed globally
1980 Human T-lymphotropic virus I Virus T-cell lymphoma-leukemia
(HTLV-1)
1981 Toxic producing strains of Bacteria Toxic shock syndrome(tampon use)
Staphylococcus aureus
1982 Escherichia coli O157:H7 Bacteria Hemorrhagic colitis; hemolytic uremic syndrome
1982 HTLV-II Virus Hairy cell leukemia
1982 Borrelia burgdorferi Bacteria Lyme disease
1983 Human immunodeficiency Virus Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)
virus(HIV)
1983 Helicobacter pylori Bacteria Peptic ulcer disease
1985 Enterocytozoon bieneusi Parasite Persistent diarrhea
1986 Cyclospora cayetanensis Parasite Persistent diarrhea
1988 Human herpes-virus-6 (HHV-6) Virus Roseola subitum
1988 Hepatitis E Virus Enterically transmitted non-A, non-B hepatitis
1989 Ehrlichia chafeensis Bacteria Human ehrlichiosis
1989 Hepatitis C Virus Parenterally transmitted non-A, non-B liver infection
1991 Guanarito virus Virus Venezuelan hemorrhagic fever
1991 Encephalitozoon hellem Parasite Conjunctivitis, disseminated disease
1991 New species of Babesia Parasite Atypical babesiosis
1992 Vibrio cholerae O139 Bacteria New strain associated with epidemic cholera
1992 Bartonella henselae Bacteria Cat-scratch disease; bacillary angiomatosis
1993 Sin Nombre virus Virus Adult respiratory distress syndrome
1993 Encephalitozoon cuniculi Parasite Disseminated disease
1994 Sabia virus Virus Brazilian hemorrhagic fever
1995 HHV-8 Virus Associated with Kaposi sarcoma in AIDS patients420 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997
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and immediate epidemiologic evidence, but the
foundations for these phenomena exist and must
be taken into account in the development of
policies. We have barely begun to study the
responses of microorganisms under stress,
although we have examples where root mecha-
nisms of adaptive mutability are themselves
responses to stress. In recent experiments,
bacterial restriction systems are more permissive
of the introduction of foreign DNA, possibly
letting down their guard in response to “mutate
or die” circumstances. This does not reflect
bacterial intelligence—that they know exactly
what mutations they should undergo in response
to environmental situations. Their intrinsic
mutability and capacity to exchange genetic
information without knowing what it is going to
be is not a constant; it is certainly under genetic
control and in some circumstances varies with
the stress under which the microbes are placed.
Evolution is more or less proportionate to the
degree of genetic divergence among the different
branches of the three-tiered tree of life, with the
archaeal branch, the eubacterial branch, and the
eukaryotes (Figure 4). The tree illustrates the
small territory occupied by humans in the overall
world of biodiversity. It shows mitochondria right
next to Escherichia coli. Bacterial invasion of a
primitive eukaryote 2-1/2 to 3 billion years ago,
synchronized with the development of primitive
green oxygen-generating plants, conferred a
selective advantage to complexes that could use
oxygen in respiration. Our ancestors were once
invaded by an oxidative-capable bacterium that
we now call a mitochondrium and that is present
in every cell of every body and almost every
species of eukaryote. We did not evolve in a
monotonous treelike development; we are also
the resynthesis of components of genetic
development that diverged as far as the bacteria
and were reincorporated into the mitochondrial
part of our overall genome. Another example of
lateral transfer is the symbiosis that resulted
from chloroplast invasion of green plants.
The outcome of encounters between mutually
antagonistic organisms is intrinsically unpredict-
able. The 1918 influenza outbreak killed half
percent of the human population; but because the
consequences were to either kill the host or leave
the host immune, the virus died out totally,
leaving no trace in our genomes, as far as we
know. Historic serology on survivors has found
memory cells and antibodies against H1N1, the
serotype of the resurrected 1918 virus. Unlike the
influenza virus, which left no known genetic
imprint, 400 to 500 retroviruses are integrated
into our human genome. The full phylogeny of
these encounters is unknown, but many of these
viruses may precede the separation of homo
sapiens from the rest of the hominid line.
Infectious agent outcomes range from mutual
annihilation to mutual integration and resynthe-
sis of a new species. Much has been made of the
fact that zoonoses are often more lethal to
humans than to their original host, but this
phenomenon cannot necessarily be generalized.
Most zoonoses do not affect humans adversely.
Some are equally capable in a new host. We tend
to pay most attention, however, to those, such as
yellow fever, for which we have not genetically or
serologically adapted and which cause severe
disease.
Canine distemper provides an example of a
quasihereditary adaptation. In the Serengeti, the
disease migrated from village dogs to jackals,
which shared prey and had contact with lions.
About one-fourth of the preserve’s 4,000 lions
died of canine distemper (4) but the survivors are
immune and will pass immunoglobulin, to their
offspring. The cubs’ maternal immunity will
Figure 4. The three-domain tree of life based on small-
subunit rRNA sequences. Reprinted with permission of
Norman R. Pace and ASM News. ASM News
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likely mitigate infection and permit a new
equilibrium, not because of genetic adaptation
but because of the preimmunized host. This is
also the most plausible explanation for how
savage the polio virus has been as a paralytic
infection of young people. It may also apply to
hepatitis, where cleaner is not always better if it
means we do not have the “street smarts” to
respond to new infectious challenges. These
nongenetic adaptations between parasite and
host complicate our outcome expectations.
Short-term shifts in equilibrium can give
ferocious but temporary advantages to a virus.
Long-term outcomes are most stable when they
involve some degree of mutual accommodation,
with both surviving longer. New short-term
deviants, however, can disrupt this equilibrium.
The final outcome of the HIV pandemic cannot be
predicted. More strains with longer latency may
be taking over, mitigating the disease. However,
deviant strains could counteract this effect by
overcoming immunity and rapidly proliferating,
with earlier and more lethal consequences.
We should also consider somatic evolution, a
Darwinian process that occurs with every infection.
In the clonal selection model of immunogenesis (5),
an apparently random production of immunoglobu-
lin variants, both by reassortment of parts and by
localized mutagenesis, gives rise to candidate
antibodies, which then proliferate in response to
matching epitopes. We do not understand the
details of how a given epitope enhances stepwise
improvements in affinity and productivity of
antibodies at various stages. The process may be
more complicated than we realize; so may
Darwinian evolution.
Despite the prior arguments against relying
on host or genotype evolution as a response to
infection, historically we have done so and now
have “scars of experience.” A notable example is
malaria, wherein the Duffy mutation against
Plasmodium vivax is the only host defense with
no deleterious consequences. The thalassemias,
G6PD deficiency, and hemoglobin S are all
hemopoietic modifications that thwart the
plasmodia; but in homozygotes, they themselves
cause disease. In the evolution of our species, for
every child spared an early death because a
hemoglobin S mutation impeded Plasmodium
development, another will succumb to sickle cell
disease unless we can intervene.  Specific
remedies do not exist. Although somatic gene
therapy is an interesting possibility, one that will
Table 2. The origin of viruses
Viruses are genomic fragments that can replicate
only in the context of an intact living cell. They cannot
therefore be primitive antecedents of cells.
Within a given species, viruses may have emerged
as genetic fragments or reduced versions from
chromosomes, plasmids, or RNA of
1) the host or related species
2) distant species
3) larger parasites of the same or different hosts
4) further evolution and genetic interchange
    among existing viruses
Once established, they may then cycle back into
the genome of the host as an integrated episome; there
they may have genetic functions or in principle might
reemerge as new viruses.
These cycles have some substantiation in the
world of bacterial viruses; but we have no clear data on
the provenience of plant or animal viruses.
probably progress in the next 20 years, it is
paradoxical that we know more about hemoglo-
bin S than any other molecular disease. The
entire concept of genetic determination of protein
structure has been based on these early
observations, yet we are still searching with limited
success for ways to put it to therapeutic use.
Biotechnology may enable other forms of
genetic intervention through which homo
sapiens could conceivably bypass natural selec-
tion and random variation. In the absence of
alternatives, we might speculate about these
kinds of “aversive therapies” as a last resort to
save our species.
The ultimate origin of life is still the subject of
many theories, as is the origin of viruses (Table
2). Each virus is different. We know nothing of
virus phylogenies and cannot even substantiate
the distinctions of the several hundred catego-
ries. We do not know their origin, only that they
interact with host genomes in many ways.
Particles could come out of any genome, become
free-living (i.e., independent, autonomously
replicating units in host cells), reenter a host
genome as retroviruses and possibly others do,
and repeat the cycle dozens of times. But no one
can give a single example or claim to have
significant knowledge of how any particular virus
evolved, thus presenting a scientific challenge for
the next 20 or 30 years.
We are dealing with more than just predation
and competition. We are dealing with a very422 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997
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Table 3. Genetic evolution
Microbes (bacteria, viruses, fungi, protozoa)
Rapid and incessant
Huge population sizes 1014+ and generation
  times in minutes vs. years
Intraclonal process
DNA replication—may be error-prone—in sea
  of mutagens sunlight; unshielded chemicals,
  incl.natural products
RNA replication—intrinsically unedited, >10-3
  swarm species
Haploid: immediate manifestation, but partial
  recessives not accumulated contra multicopy
   plasmids
Amplification
Site-directed inversions and transpositions:
  phase variation
?? Other specifically evolved mechanisms:
  genome quadrant duplication; silencing
Interclonal process
Promiscuous recombination—not all
  mechanisms are known
Conjugation—dozens of species
Viral transduction and lysogenic integration:
  universal
Classical: phage-borne toxins in
  C. diphtheriae
Plasmid interchange (by any of above) and
  integration
Toxins of B. anthracis
Pasteur: heat attenuation: plasmid loss;
  chemically induced
RNA viral reassortment; ?? and
  recombination?
Transgressive—across all boundaries
Artificial gene splicing
Bacteria and viruses have picked up host
  genes (antigenic masking?)
Interkingdom: P. tumefaciens and plants,
  E. coli and  yeast
Vegetable and mineral! oligonucleotides
  and yeast.
Host-parasite coevolution
Coadaptation to mutualism or accentuation
  of virulence?
Jury is still out (May and Anderson). Many
  zoonotic convergences.
Probably divergent phenomena, with short-
  term flareups and Pyrrhic victories, atop
  long-term trend to coadaptation.
complicated coevolutionary process, involving
merger, union, bifurcation, and reemergence of
new species (Table 3). Divergent phenomena can
occur in any binary association, with unpredict-
able outcomes. We have hundreds of retroviruses
in our genome and no knowledge of how they got
there. As to HIV, we have no evidence as yet that
it has ever entered anyone’s germ line genome:
we really do not know whether it ever enters
germ cells. The outcomes of even that interaction
could be much more complicated than the purely
parasite/host relationships we are accustomed to.
Innovative technologies for dealing with
microbial threats have the potential for fascinat-
ing therapeutic opportunities (Table 4). Some,
like bacteriophage, have been set aside as
laboratory curiosities. Nothing is more exciting
than unraveling the details of pathogenesis.
Having the full genomes of half a dozen parasitic
organisms opens up new opportunities for
therapeutic invention in ways that we could not
have dreamed of even 5 years ago, which will lead
to many more technologies. In food microbiology,
we should keep in mind the probiotic as well as
the adversarial and pathogenetic opportunities
in our alimentary tracts.
 The Committee on International Science
Engineering and Technology report (2) provides
some recommendations (Table 5). We need a
global perspective. We need to invest in public
health, especially food microbiology, not just
medical care, in dealing with disease. It is
important to prevent foodborne disease through
sensible monitoring, standards of cleanliness,
and consumer and food-handler education and
not just care for its victims.
Today we emphasize individual rights over
community needs more than we did 50 to 75 years
ago. Restraining the rights and freedoms of
individuals is a far greater sin than allowing the
infection of others. The restraints placed on
Typhoid Mary might not be acceptable today,
when some would prefer to give her unlimited
rein to infect others, with litigation their only
recourse. In the triumph of individual rights, the
public health perspective has had an uphill
struggle in recent pandemics.
Education, however, is a universally accepted
countermeasure, especially important in
foodborne diseases. Food safety programs should
more specifically target food handlers, examining
their hands to determine if they are carriers, to
ensure they are complying with basic sanitation.423 Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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We typically do this only after an outbreak.
Perhaps we should have further debate on the
social context for constraints and persuasion to
contain the spread of infectious agents.
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Table 4. Technologies to address microbial threats
Antibacterial chemotherapy
Potentially unlimited capability; bacterial
    metabolism and genetic structure notably
   different from human genome sequencing
    pointing to bacterial vulnerabilities
Economic-structural factors—public expectation
    for unachievable bargains in safety
    assurance, cost of development, and ultimate
    pricing
Dilemmas of regulation of (ab)use
Resurgent interest in bacteriophage and other
    biologically oriented approaches
Antiviral chemotherapy
Much more difficult program, inherently
Gross underinvestment
New approaches: antisense, ribozymes,
    targeted D/RNA cleavers
Problematics of sequence-selective targets
Vaccines
Gross underinvestment; other structural
    problems as above
Liability/indemnification
Vaccination as service to the herd
New approaches: hot biotechnology is
   coming along especially live attenuated:
    but testing dilemmas
Safety issues about use of human cells lines;
    adjuvants
Immunoglobulins and their progeny
Phage display and diversification:
    biosynthetic antibody
Passive immunization for therapy
Biologic response modifiers
New world of interleukins, cell growth factors
    so far just scratching surface
Interaction with pathogenesis
Intersection with somatic gene therapy
Technologies for diagnosis and monitoring
Etiologic agents and control
Host polymorphisms and sensitivities
Homely technologies needed
Simple, effective face-masks
Palatable water-disinfectants
Home-use diagnostics of contamination
Table 5. CISET* recommendations for addressing global
infectious disease threats
1. Concerted global and domestic surveillance and
diagnosis of disease outbreaks and endemic
occurrence. This must entail the installation of
sophisticated laboratory capabilities at many
centers now lacking them.
2. Vector management and monitoring and
enforcement of safe water and food supplies; and
personal hygiene (e.g., Operation Clean Hands).
3. Public and professional education.
4. Scientific research on causes of disease, pathogenic
mechanisms, bodily defenses, vaccines, and
antibiotics.
5. Cultivation of the technical fruits of such research,
with the full involvement of the pharmaceutical
industry and a public understanding of the
regulatory and incentive structures needed to
optimize the outcomes.
*Committee on International Science, Engineering and
Technology Policy of the National Science and Technology
Council.